Abstract-In this paper, we consider the secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel in the presence of causal state information and secure rate-limited feedback. In this scenario, the causal state information from the channel is available to both the legitimate transmitter and legitimate receiver. In addition, the legitimate receiver can send secure feedback to the transmitter at a limited rate R f . We shown that the secrecy capacity is bounded by
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing demand for network connectivity and high data rates dictate efficient utilization of resources, such as sharing of a common medium for communication. However, in many practical applications, it is important to assure privacy is not compromised. Privacy, however, has its price. On the one hand, one may use cryptographic schemes to protect data from eavesdropping. Such schemes usually involve a computational burden. Information theoretic security, however, offers privacy at the price of transmission rate. Indeed, in recent years, information theoretic security was found useful from physical layer [1] schemes to networking applications [2] .
A canonical model for information theoretic security was given by Wyner in [3] . Therein, the wiretap channel, described in Figure 1 , was introduced. In a wiretap channel, Bob receives the transmitted message of Alice via a channel C1, called the main channel. The eavesdropper Eve, however, observes information transmitted by Alice through the wiretap channel, C2. The legitimate parties wish to communicate through C1 while concealing the information from Eve. Hence, Alice wishes to encodes its message M and transmit a codeword X n on the channel C1. Bob receives Y n , while Eve receives Z n . The legitimate pair's objectives are security, that is, Z n should provide no information about M (more precisely, 1 n I(M ; Z) → 0 as n → ∞), and reliability, that is, M should be decoded from Y n with a negligibly small probability of error. The rate at which both objectives can be fulfilled is called the secrecy capacity. For discrete memoryless wiretap and eavesdropper channels (DMCs), Wyner showed that the secrecy capacity is
{I(U ; Y ) − I(U ; Z)}.
When the main channel is "less noisy" than the wiretap channel, this reduces to
{I(X; Y ) − I(X; Z)}.
An important concept in the achieveability of the above result is the added randomness, used to confuse the eavesdropper regarding the actual message sent. The current literature includes several generalizations of the canonical model given in [3] . We include here only the most relevant. A thorough discussion of related works is given in Section III. In [4] , Ahlswede and Cai considered a discrete memoryless wiretap channel with secure output feedback. A general feedback link was considered by Ardestanizadeh et al. in [5] . Therein, since the feedback was not limited to merely pass the output symbols Y n , the authors showed that it is beneficial to use the feedback to send fresh randomness, to be used as a shared key between Alice and Bob.
In [6] , Liu and Chen considered a wiretap model where the main channel is a state-dependent DMC. While the eavesdropper remains ignorant of the state, the authors considered Fig. 2 . The setting considered in this paper. On top of the Wyner wiretap model, a feedback link is available from the legitimate receiver to the transmitter. Moreover, the state information at the main channel is available causally to the legitimate parties. Both the main channel and the wiretap channel are DMCs.
the cases where the transmitter and legitimate receiver may or may not have non-causal knowledge of the state. The closely related problem of secret key agreement in the wiretap channel with non-causal state information was considered in [7] . The work in [6] was later extended in [8] when causal state information is available by Chia and El Gamal. At the heart of Chia and El Gamal's methods stands a key generation scheme. Again, this key, shared by Alice and Bob, was used to increase the secrecy capacity. The works in [6] - [8] do not include a feedback link.
A. Main Contribution
In this work, we consider the system depicted in Figure 2 . In this setting, both channel state information (CSI) and feedback are available. We derive upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity, and show that when the main channel is less noisy than the eavesdropper's, the bounds are tight and describe the secrecy capacity exactly. In the direct, we show that a combined scheme of both types of key generation is required to achieve the results: on top of the Wyner scheme, one has to create a shared key from the state information and send an additional key through the feedback link. The converse is more involved, and requires showing that indeed such a use of the feedback link is optimal. We prove the converse via a non-trivial recursive lemma, which enables us to include both state and feedback. The resulting region reduces to previously known results in the literature when the feedback or state information are not available, and thus extends them. Moreover, when state information is available only at the legitimate decoder, a comparison of achievable schemes suggests that, unlike previously known results [5] , one should not use the feedback to send fresh randomness (to be used as a shared key), but rather losslessly describe the state to the transmitter.
Applications of the above results include, but are not limited to, cases where the eavesdropper channel in not weaker than the main channel, yet, one can achieve secure communication via channel state and feedback, extending the range of scenarios where information theoretic security can be used in practice. Moreover, a deep understanding of the capacity of the wiretap channel under diverse conditions such as state information and feedback will facilitate the application of such physical layer security concepts to modern, real word networks, where state information and feedback (available through estimation or two way communication) are available, but to date, are not used at their full potential.
The structure of this work is as follows. In Section II, the problem is formally described. In Section III, we summarize the related work. Section IV includes our main results. Section V includes a description of a few important special cases. As for the proofs, Section VII includes the direct, while Section VII includes the converse. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formally define the problem at hand. A discrete memoryless wiretap channel (DMWTC) in the presence of secure rate limited feedback and causal state information is given in Figure 2 . In this case, both Alice the encoder and Bob the decoder have access to the state information V i . In general, the state information can be available non-causally as in [6] or causally as in [8] . In this paper, we focus on the causal case. Alice desire is keeping Eve ignorant as possible from the confidential message, denoted as M ∈ {1, . . . , 2 nR }, sent to Bob. Throughout the paper, capital letters denote random variables, lower case letters denote their realizations, and calligraphic letters denote the alphabet. Thus, the sent message is (X 1 , . . . , X n ) = X n , X ∈ X , the output at the legitimate receiver is Y n , Y ∈ Y, and the output at the eavesdropper is Z n , Z ∈ Z. The main channel is affected by a memoryless state sequence V n , V ∈ V, known causally to both the encoder and the legitimate decoder. We assume a memoryless channel, that is,
In the case where just the main channel is affected by the state information, the cross-over probabilities at the wiretap channel are
We assume a rate-limited feedback at rate R f is available from the decoder to the encoder. That is, symbols K 
The causal dependency of the symbol K f i at instant i comes from the fact that it only depends on prior outputs up to instant
) and the prior
f . Note that, with a slight misuse of notation, a single instant of the feedback value at time i is denoted
f . This will remain throughout the paper. We allow a random feedback, that is, its actual values can depend on some conditional probability distributions
f ). Thus, the code with parameters (2 nR , 2 nR f , n) for the wiretap channel in the presence of causal state information and ratelimited feedback is defined by a message set {1, . . . , 2 nR }; The conditional probability distributions of the stochastic coding for the legitimate encoder
, where m denotes the message to be sent; The conditional probability distributions of the (possibly) random feedback
The decoded message is thuŝ
Denote the error probability
e . If for any ε > 0, there exists an (2 nR , 2 nR f , n) code satisfying
we say that the rate/normalized equivocation tuple
is achievable. Furthermore, we say the secrecy capacity is C s if C s is the supremum of R in the tuples (R, R f , 1) satisfying the inequalities in (2). Namely, tuples where asymptotically, the eavesdropper is ignorant of the message sent.
III. RELATED WORK
The first information theoretic study on the problem of securely transmitting a message over a public channel was done in [9] . Therein, Shannon considered the problem of transmitting a message M from the legitimate sender to the legitimate receiver via an open channel. Perfect secrecy was defined by I(M ; X) = 0, where X is the transmitted word. The result was that the legitimate parties must share a key of the same length as the message itself in order to achieve such a strong secrecy requirement. However, as was shown later, slightly relaxing the perfect secrecy constraint is beneficial.
The wiretap channel discussed in Section I (Figure 1 ) was presented in [3] , under only an asymptotic independence constraint (requiring 1 n I(M ; Z n ) to vanish). For this channel, one would expect that when the capacity of the main channel is larger than that of the wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity will be positive. In [3] , indeed Wyner proved that when the wiretap channel is a degraded version of the main channel, the secrecy capacity is positive. [10] extended this and concluded that a positive secrecy capacity is possible whenever the main channel is less noisy than the wiretap. Moreover, as was later discussed in [5] , [6] , [8] , even if the wiretap channel is not degraded, or less noisy, the secrecy capacity can be positive using state information. We elaborate on this now.
A. Channel State Information
In [6] , a DMWTC with CSI at both ends was discussed. The conditional probability of the main channel was specified through P (y|x, v 1 , v 2 ), were the CSI V at the decoder have some joint probability distribution. The conditional probability of Eve's channel was p(z|x, v 1 , v 2 ).
Therein, the following information rates were defined.
U was an auxiliary random variable and, in addition, a
It was shown that the set
is achievable, where
The formulation above is based on the definitions in [11] , [12] . For example, in the Gaussian case, the complete rate equivocation region R L given byRd ≤ C s and R ≤ C M , where the main channel capacity is C M and the secrecy capacity is C s . Under these definitions, the achievability of the entire region was established by considering the two extreme points, (C s , 1) and (C M ; C s /C M ), and applying a time sharing argument. The point (R, 1) is defined as perfect secrecy. Indeed, note that the result of Liu and Chen gives rise to the special case of
. This is an achievable rate for the wiretap channel with two-sided non-causal state information. We will be interested in a special case, where the state information is available only at the receiver, that is V 1 = ∅, V 2 = V . In this case, we have
In a recent paper [8] , Chia and El-Gamal considered a similar setting, yet with causal state information. As mentioned, at the heart of the scheme is a key generation step. In particular, random binning of the state sequence known to both the encoder and decoder gives rise to a shared key. This key is used to encrypt part of the message. The achievable scheme results in higher rates compared to [6] . In particular, they established that
When Y is less noisy than Z, this results in
min{I(X; Y |V )−I(X; Z|V )+H(V |Z), I(X; Y |V )}.
Secrete agreement schemes for channels with state known at the transmitter were given in [7] . It is also important to note that CSI has been found useful in the context of MIMOWiretap channels as well. Secrecy capacity (and in particular, outage) was discussed in [13] , where it was shown that one can take the advantage of having perfect knowledge of the channel state to the legitimate receiver by adding artificial noise to the null space of the main channel. Later results regarding the optimal beamforming vectors can be found in [14] . The advantage of perfect knowledge of the channel state to the legitimate receiver was also used in [15] under a Rician fading setting. Finally, the current literature also includes work on active eavesdropping in the presence of channel state [16] . Note that the literature on wiretap channels with state is established on the foundations of channel coding with state (regardless of any security constraint). For an overview and duality results, see [17] .
B. Feedback
In this work, besides state information, we are interested in the availability of a clean feedback as well. Interactions in secure duplex communication can benefit from the insights of such models. Indeed, we will establish that in the case of wiretap channels with CSI, feedback can increase the secrecy capacity significantly.
In [4] , the authors characterized the capacity of a wiretap channel with clean feedback of the channel output, and showed that in this case,
This is exactly the capacity when one extracts a key from the feedback (as feedback does not increase capacity otherwise).
In [5] , the authors investigated the secrecy capacity C s (R f ) of a wiretap channel where the legitimate parties have a secure link (feedback) from the decoder to the encoder at rate R f . Note that the feedback was not limited to carry output symbols (we allow general feedback in this work as well). The upper bound in [5] was
Again, when the wiretap channel is physically degraded p(y, z|x) = p(y|x)p(z|y), the upper bound is tight, establishing (5) as the secrecy capacity.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we list the main results of the paper. Direct and converse proofs are given in Section VI and Section VII, respectively.
A. Lower Bound
The achievability part presented in this paper, proves that the rate equivocation region for a DMWTC in presence of rate-limited feedback and causal SCI at the encoder and decoder is dictated by the following three rates:
The achievability of the entire rate rate region can be proved by proving the achievability of the rate equitation pairs
In this paper, we focus on (6), and thus prove the following secrecy capacity lower bound.
Theorem 1. Assume a DMWTC, when causal CSI is given at the legitimate encoder and at the legitimate decoder and in the presence of rate limited feedback. Then, the secrecy capacity is lower bounded as
B. Upper Bound
Our converse result is the following.
Theorem 2. Assume a DMWTC, when the causal CSI is given at the legitimate encoder and at the legitimate decoder and in the presence of rate limited feedback. Then, the secrecy capacity is upper bounded as
C. Complete Characterization of the Secrecy Capacity
It is interesting to investigate the cases where the lower and upper bound match. Indeed, if, in addition to the original Markov condition, we also have I(U ; Z|V ) ≤ I(U ; Y |V ), i.e., if the output of the eavesdropper channel is more noisy (or degraded) than the output of the main channel, by a simple application of the data processing inequality and the above assumption we have the following. Corollary 1. Assume a DMWTC, when the causal CSI is given at the legitimate encoder and at the legitimate decoder and in the presence of rate limited feedback. If the main channel is less noisy than the wiretap, then the secrecy capacity is
Example 1. In this example, we compare several scenarios for a degraded binary symmetric wiretap channel, where the scenarios differ by the availability of channel state and noiseless feedback.
A degraded DMWTC with clean feedback and without CSI is given in Figure 3 A. The main channel between Alice and Bob is a binary symmetric channel with a transition probability p y . That is,
We denote this channel model by BSC(p y ). The wiretap channel is realized by cascading the main binary symmetric channel, BSC(p y ), and the eavesdropper's binary symmetric channel, BSC(p z ).
A degraded wiretap channel with clean feedback and CSI is shown in Figure 3 B. Now, the main BSC is state-dependent, that is, it is BSC(p vi ) if the state at time i is v i . The wiretap channel is a cascade of this channel and BSC(p z ). The maximum of C N V s (R f ) (over the input distribution), i.e., the capacity of the degraded DMWTC without CSI yet with feedback, and the maximum of C V s (R f ), i.e., the capacity of the degraded DMWTC with CSI and feedback, are both achieved using a symmetric input probability distribution, namely, P (X = 0) = P (X = 1) = 0.5. Thus, X, Y and Z are uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. The binary entropy function and the binary convolution are denoted by h(p) = −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p) and by p y * p z = p y (1−p z )+(1−p y )p z , respectively. With these distributions, without state information (case A) the secrecy capacity is (details can be found in [18] )
Now, assume the main channel has state (Case B). We assume only two states are possible, and each state corresponds to a different cross over probability in the main channel. That is, assume P (V = v 0 ) = 1 − q and otherwise. Hence, for the case with state information, (case B) the secrecy capacity is
Numerical results for the capacities above are given in Figure  4 . The cross-over probabilities are fixed on p z = p y = 0.1, p v0 = 0.05 and p v1 = 0.15. The figure depicts the capacities C
The same saturation phenomenon observed with no state is visible with state as well (with linear increase until the saturation point), however, it is clear that the possible probabilities for each state affect the capacity. This effect is, in fact, twofold. First, the value of the state affects the capacity of the direct channel. Yet, besides this effect, regardless of the actual cross-over probabilities, the fact that there is a state sequence affects the secrecy capacity. The more entropy the state sequence has, the higher the key rate, hence the faster the capacity saturates at its maximal value (which is the main channel capacity). Additional numerical results and explanations for the above example can be found in [18] .
V. SPECIAL CASES
The rate region given in this work for a wiretap channel with state information and feedback has a few important special cases. Due to space limitations, reductions which show that our result generalizes known results in the literature appear in [18] . Herein, we give an interesting observation on the case where the CSI is given only to the legitimate receiver. This surprising result shows that in certain cases, it is beneficial to use the feedback to send the encoder the state information, rather than pure random bits to be used as a key. 
A. Causal State Information Provide Only to the Legitimate Decoder
We consider the following case where the rate limited feedback is available but the causal CSI is given only to the legitimate decoder. Figure 5 depicts this scenario. Note that without the feedback, this case coincides with case 3 in [6] .
Consider two possible achievable schemes for this scenario. The first is as follows. Using a scheme similar to the one used in the achievability herein, that is, use the feedback solely in order to send a key to the transmitter, and use this key to encrypt part of the message, the resulting lower bound is
where, V and U are independent and the joint distribution is defined as p(v)p(u)p(x|u)p(yz|x, v). However, in this case, it is interesting to discuss a different achievable scheme, where instead of sending fresh randomness through the feedback, the decoder sends the state sequence (if the rate limit permits). The question that then arises is, of course, which scheme is more capable: sending a random key or sending the state sequence?
Assume for now that R f = H(V ). By (8) , when a secret key is sent through the feedback channel, we have the following bound on the secrecy capacity.
If instead of sending a key through the secure rate-limited feedback, one sends the state information, and the encoder uses this information to both generate a key and optimize the main channel capacity, as in the proof of the lower bound R U 1 when R f = H(V ), we have
We now show that the achievable scheme which results in (9) is indeed favorable. In [18] , we show that in out case, the following holds:
While the two expressions are equal, it is clear that the later achievability scheme is favorable as the optimization is over all possible p(u|v) and not simply p(u). This is similar to the difference between channel coding with state at both encoder and decoder compared to state only at the decoder. When R f > H(V ), the same scheme can be used, yet, in addition to sending the state information from the decoder to the encoder through the secure rate limited feedback, one can send also a key K f , with H(K f ) < R f − H(V ). The encoding procedure is as in the proof of the lower bound R U 1 . For this case, the resulting secrecy capacity is bounded by
When R f < H(V ), we conjecture that the preferred scheme is to send through the secure rate limited feedback the compressed state information V , and use it to extract common randomness, though, of course, at rate smaller than H(V ).
Remark 1. Note that in the case where there is state information only at the encoder and, in addition, a secure feedback is available, similar arguments to the one used above can be used. Thus, we conjecture that by case 4 in [6] , [8] , and when adding the secure rate limited feedback, the resulting bound is
VI. LOWER BOUND (PROOF SKETCH)
In this section, we give a sketch of the direct proof. A complete proof can be found in [18] .
A. Achievability of R U1
Consider the rate equivocation pair (R U l , 1), and similar to [8] , we perform the maximization in R U1 through distributions p(u ), p(x|u, v) and functions of the form u(u , v), using the functional representation lemma [19] . This way, the achievability can be proved for an equivalent characterization of R U 1 , max
We split the proof to two cases, the first is when I(U ; Y, V ) ≥ I(U ; Z, V ), where for this case (U , V ) ↔ (X, V ) ↔ (Y, Z) from a Markov chain, and the second case is when I(U ; Y, V ) ≤ I(U ; Z, V ).
1) First Case -I(U ; Y, V ) ≥ I(U ; Z, V ): a) Encoding of Legitimate Sender (Alice): The encoding scheme in this case requires the transmission of only B − 1 independent (protected) blocks during the transmission of B blocks (each of length n). The message in the first block is not fully protected.
Given a distribution P U and a function u(u , v), we set the following three rates:
The coding scheme we suggest will correspond to a transmission rate R = R 0 + R 1 + R 2 = R U1 − 3 , secretly from the eavesdropper.
To encode the message we split the message M j , j ∈ {2, . . . , B}, into three independent messages M 0 ∈ {1, . . . ,
nR2 }, where the message at rate R 0 will be the one protected by the Wyner wiretap coding scheme, while the messages at rate R 1 + R 2 will be the ones protected by the keys. To send message M j , j ∈ {2, . . . , b} given M
2) Second Case -I(U ; Y, V ) ≤ I(U ; Z, V ): Herein, the main channel capacity is too low, and the encoder cannot use the Wyner wiretap scheme to secretly send message to the legitimate receiver. Therefore, only the two keys, the one resulting from the CSI and the one resulting from the feedback can be used to protect the message. We only consider the scenario where (I(U ; Y |V ) − I(U ; Z|V )) + (H(V |Z) + R f ) > 0. Otherwise for this case the secrecy capacity is zero. The same key splitting as in [8] is used.
VII. UPPER BOUND (PROOF SKETCH)
We now give a proof sketch for the converse result. The full proof of the upper bound and Lamma 1 below can be found in [18] .
Assume n , δ n → 0 when n → ∞. Consider first the two upper bounds, when the CSI V is available at both transmitter and legitimate receiver, and a feedback at rate R f is present,
and
The upper bound presented in (12) is obtained from Fano's inequality [17, Theorem 7.7.1] . That is, the secrecy capacity cannot be greater than the channel capacity.
The converse result is given by combining (12) and (13), showing that the secrecy capacity rate must satisfy R ≤ max In fact, (14) is obtained from the concavity of the mutual information as in [17] and the introduction of a time sharing random variable.
We now continue similar to [5] using Fano's inequality, the fact that L n → 0 (the constraint on the secrecy) and the fact that 1 n n i=1 log(|K f i |) ≤ R f . Together with Lemma 1 below, a non-trivial extension of the results in [5] for a wiretap with state information, we prove the upper bound presented in (13) . By Fano's inequality, forM =m(Y n , K n f , V n ),
e nR = n n ,
Using the secrecy constraint,
where γ n → 0 as n → ∞. Consequently,
where (a) follows from (15), (b) follows from Fano's inequality, and (c) follows by defining δ n = n + γ n . As mentioned, the following lemma extends [5] to wiretap channels with state. Due to space limitation, its proof is given in [18] .
Lemma 1. Assume a memoryless channel for which
